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IN THE STATE COURT OF SPALDING COUNTY 

STATE OF GEORGIA 

WENTWORTH MAYNARD and KAREN 
MAYNARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 

CHRISTAL MCGEE and SNAPCHAT, 

INC., 
Defendants. 
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT SNAPCHAT, INC.'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Snapchat, Inc.'sl 
("Snapchat") Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Judgment on the Pleadings 
(the "Motion to Dismiss"). The Court, having considered the pleadings, papers, and 
proposed orders submitted each party, the arguments of counsel made at the hearing 
before the Court on November 23,2016, as well as reviewed the transcript from that 
hearing, and this Court finds that good cause exists to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss. It 
is HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. This legal action arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on 
September 10, 2015 in Clayton County, Georgia when a vehicle driven by Defendant 
Christal McGee ("Ms. McGee") collided with a vehicle driven by Plaintiff Wentworth 
Maynard ("Mr. Maynard.") (PI. Amend. CompI. ~ 34). 
Snapchat, Inc. recently changed its name to Snap Inc ., but the company 's smartphone application continues to be 
referred to as "Snapchat." 
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2. Plaintiffs Ms. McGee was traveling an 	 above 
hour and was "distracted and on her phone" at the time of the collision. ld. 
at ~~ 30, 32, 33. 
Plaintiffs also that, at the time of the collision, Ms. "intended 
to information about how fast she was driving on Snapchat and she was 
speeds in furtherance her use "ld. ~ 31. 
l"H"Ol"Oti4. Plaintiffs further Maynard permanent injuries as a 
result of the collision. 
Plaintiffs have a cause of action Snapchat 
negligence. ld., Count I, ~ 64. allege Snapchat had knowledge of 
of "speed filter" while driving at speeds but 
to "remove or access to the " ld. ~ In addition, Plaintiff 
Karen Maynard ("Mrs. Maynard"), Mr. Maynard's a claim 
consortium. ld. ~~ 36-38. 
6. Snapchat denies Plaintiffs' allegations it and '-L'-"U'-''-' all liability and 
causation as Snapchat. See generally Answer to PI. Am. CompI.; Motion to 
Dismiss. 
7· 	 Plaintiffs their Complaint on April Court 
a of Df()Ceeo.mg until 2016. 
on 29, Snapchat timely filed its: (1) Answer; (2) Motion 
to Dismiss or, in Alternative, For Judgment on the Pleadings; and (3) Motion for 
8. On August 30,2016, filed Complaint 
("Amended Complaint"), which is the operative Complaint. On September 16, 2016, 
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Snapchat filed its: (1) Verified Answer to Amended Complaint; and (2) 
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Complaint the on 
the 
9· On 2016,a was on Motion 
II. 	 APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
"Generally, when a motion to involves a factual issue as to a question of 
abatement, that is, lack of jurisdiction, improper process, 
of of or to join a party, court is 
under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(d) to hear and determine these defenses before trial without a 
jury on application of any party." Equity Trust Co. v. No. A16A0813, 20 WL 
at (Ga. App. Oct. 19, 2016). 
A motion to for to a claim is "Y'An"'Y' granted when "the 
allegations the complaint disclose with certainty that claimant would not be 
entitled to relief under state provable in support and.. 
movant that the claimant could not introduce within the 
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant ofthe relief sought." Common 
Cause/Georgia v. ofAtlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 481, 761 (2005)· 
III. 
The Court further finds that Plaintiffs' be AH",.J'-'U against 
Snapchat on the they are barred by the Communications l.Jv'LA.d,Jlv Act, 47 
§ 230 (c) ("the CDA"). 
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The was by 1996 to Internet platforms the 
threat lawsuits nature of Internet 
To that protection, provided "broad immunity under 
based providers[.]" Doe v. MySpace, 528 413,418 (5th Cir. 
("Doe f'). The immunity provision "No provider or user an interactive 
computer shall treated as publisher or of any 
provided by another information content provider." U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
question of the immunity a case should be decided at "the 
because immunity not only 
liability, having fight costly and protracted litigation battles." Nemet 
v. Inc., 250, (4th 
where a seeks to hold an online platform liable and CDA bars action, 
is appropriate. at 
Courts consensus to ...."..........",. Section immunity 
broadly." IIv.MySpace 175 Cal. 4th 561, (2009). Courts 
the immunity provision have lawsuits where a to 
an Internet platform as a publisher to it for a id.; see also, 
e.g., Saponaro v. LLC, Supp. 3d 319 CD.N.J. 2015); v.AOL 
Warner, Inc., Supp. 532,538 Va. 2003); Green v. America Online, 3 
465,470 (3d Cir. Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 
F.3d 980, 986 (10th 2000). 
The key the CDA is Internet v. 
where Court of "courts have 
that § provides a 'robust' immunity, that all doubts must 
4 
resolved favor of immunity." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) citing 
Holomaxx Technologies v. Corp., 2011 U. S. LEXIS (III) 
(N. 	 Ca. 
"Courts duty the alleges defendant 
derives from the defendant's or conduct as a publisher or it 
section 230(c)(1) precludes liability." v. Inc., 1l01­
02 (9th 2009). concluded that ue;\,.101\j1l0 relating to the monitoring, 
deletion of related a 
" I, 528 F.3d the 
website" such as decisions "features that are 
design" - "reflect choices about what can on and 
what and thus "fall within the purview traditional publisher " Jane 
1 v. Backpage.com, 817 20-21 (1st Cir. 
The finds the CDA and liability. 
conclusion, arguing that their negligence claim against is 
that Snapchat The IS the was 
'independently created or by third-party users.' " Jape, 
of the questions in this case is whether (1) Snapchat had a duty 
Mr. Maynard's was to Snapchat of users' 
alleged accidents while and Snapchat should 
access to" the filter" after it out these 
accidents allegedly caused. (Amend. CompL ~ 41). 
question 
""UU0e; it 
Snapchat correctly points out, the accordingly to impose 
a duty on status or conduct as a publisher" ­
and the CDA liability" based on Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. 
Further, "'<'nr"' ...... ,- of the Snapchat application, and regarding 
the of [aJ "choices about what content can 
on the website and what form" also are protected by CDA Jane Doe 1, 
817 F.3d at 20-21. 
These "choices" the users can are arn:ral'1 from Snapchat's as a 
publisher, and are immunized under F.3d at 1101-02. 
..... ""'....,..".,, the Court finds that the user in a may 
information included or is Snapchafs speech, is 
the speech voluntary options Snapchat's platform. 
Communications Therefore, Motion is GRANTED 
that 
Court granted Snapchat's Motion to Dismiss on the 
grounds regarding the "CDA," address Defendant 
arguments for dismissal. 
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SO ORDERED, this of January, 2017. 
BY: 
GREENBERGTRAURlG, LLP 
LORI G. COHEN 
Georgia Bar 
MARK TRIGG 
No. 
JANNA NUGENT 
Bar. No. 940465 
200 
• ....,u..uvu Road, 
Suite 2500 
Atlanta, GA 30305 
Telephone: (678) 553-2100 
(678) 
Counselfor Defendant Snapchat, Inc. 
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